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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
VALLEY INVEST'ME·NT 'CO., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7300

LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAIL-·
RO·AD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This action was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah by the plaintiff, a Utah corporation, who sought therein to quiet its title to the property described in the complaint. The case was tried before
the Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, sitting without a jury,
and after trial rather lengthy briefs were filed. After due
consideration thereon, Judge Hogenson decided the case
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in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and
signed findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein it
was determined that the plaintiff's right to quiet title to
such property was barred by the statute of limitations, specifically the four year limitation statute applicable to defective tax titles as set forth in Chapters 19 and 20, Laws of
Utah, 19~43.
STATEME·NT OF FAC'TS
Most of the facts in the case were stipulated, but in
addition to the stipulation certain recitals in deeds and
certain other documents were introduced in evidence, and
some little testimony was given with respect to the nature
of the property and facts pertaining to possession or occupancy of_ the property.
The property involved was owned by one Oscar F.
Hunter from 189~4 to 1928. In 1928 the said Oscar 'F. Hunter
executed a deed wherein he conveyed the property to his
nine children-or- to eight children, the interest of the ninth
going to three children of a deceased child. In that deed to
the nine children it was recited that the conveyance was
"subject to a life estate in Mindwell Chipman Hunter and
Anna Elizabeth Hindley Hunter and survivor." There is
nothing shown in the record as to any such life estate having been conveyed to these two women, and they were apparently polygamous wives of Oscar F. Hunter, although
Mindwell !Chipman Hunter signed as wife in the deed conveying the prol?erty to the nine children. Later Mindwell
Chipman Hunter furnished information for the death certificate covering the death of Anna Elizabeth Hindley
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3
Hunter wherein it was certified that the said Anna Elizabeth Hindley Hunter was the wife of Oscar F. Hunter. The
status of these two wives, or as to which may have been
considered the lawful wife-whether material or not-was
not otherwise cleared up by the record.
In 1931 the nine children who had received the property
by deed from Oscar F. Hunter in 1928 executed various deeds
by which they conveyed whatever interest they had in the
property to Mindwell Chipman Hunter (Tr. 43-44). Under
date of February 29, 1936, Mindwell C. Hunter gave a bargain and sale deed covering the property to Irene Hunter
Chamberlain. Under date of November 21, 1937, Irene H.
Chamberlain McAlpine of Portland, Oregon, execp.ted a
quitclaim deed to the plaintiff, Valley Investment :Co., a
Utah corporation.
The property in question during all of this time was
vacant, unimproved, alkali property (T~r. 47, 58) . There is
no evidence that any of plaintiff's predecessors held actual
possession of the property at any time after 1930, and the
record affirmatively shows that there was no such physical
occupation of the property by plaintiff or any of its predecessors since March 31, 1936 (Tr. 66). The general property taxes for the year 1930 as assessed to the heirs of Oscar
F. Hunter, as named in the deed of 1928, were not paid, and
a treasurer's tax sale for nonpayment of such taxes was
made on December 22, 19'30 (E·xhibit 2.). The taxes for the
years 1931, 19'3.2, 19'3:3, 1934 and 1935 were also unpaid,
and there was no redemption of the treasurer's sale for the
unpaid 1930 taxes, as a result of which an auditor's tax
deed to Salt Lake ·County covering said property was exeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

cuted on March 31, 1936 (Exhibit 3). On November 7, 1941,
pursuant to the provisions of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section
68, Revised Laws of Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 101
of the Session Laws of Utah 1939·, Salt Lake ~County issued
its deed by which it quitclaimed to the defendant, Los
Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, the property involved in this action (Exhibit 4). In 1'9-41 defendant built
spur tracks across this property to serve the Remington
Arms Plant.
The taxes as they had been assessed upon this property,
as shown by Exhibit 2, were in the neighborhood of $15.00
per year. After 1932 they fell below $15.00 per year. The
price paid by the defendant for the quitclaim deed, shown
as the consideration in Exhibit 4, was $172.46. This amount
would be approximately the equivalent of the six years'
taxes-1930 to 193.5, inclusive-as shown in Exhibit 2, plus
a similar average yearly amount for the additional six
years up to and including 1941. Thus it is apparent that the
defendant in purchasing said property from the county paid
to the county an amount to equal taxes which should have
been paid on the property from and after the year 1930,
when the plaintiff's predecessors first failed to. pay said
taxes. Regardless of whether plaintiff will admit that the
recital in the deed, Exhibit 4, is sufficient to show payment
of the amount of all of these taxes, the plaintiff nevertheless stipulated that the defendant did pay all taxes assessed
against said property for the years 1942 to 1947, inclusive
(Tr. 50).
The defendant has been in possession of the property
from August, 19,41 to the present time, and neither plain-
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tiff nor any of its predecessors in interest has possessed or
physically occupied said property at any time since March
31, 19-36 (Tr. 6·6).
At the time of the treasurer's tax sale for delinquent
taxes as made on December 22, 1930, the auditor'·s affidavits as were required by statute were not attached to the
assessment roll. This lack of the auditor's affidavits constitutes the only defect in the whole procedure. At least
no other defects were shown by the record, and except that
such defects be shown, the auditor's deed and tax sale themselves are prima facie proof that all necessary proceedings
were taken (Section 80-10-68 (7), Utah ·Code Annotated
1943).
ARGU'M:ENT
ARGUMENT N·O. 1
THE :COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO
SIGN AND FILE PLAINTIF'F'S PRO,POSED FINDiNGS.
Plaintiff and appellant assigned 27 errors. However,
in his argument counsel for appellant did not address himself specifically to any particular assigned error but grouped
them together, and the purport of the majority of the errors
as assigned by appellant merely states in effect that the
court should have decided for the plaintiff and against the
defendant and shoula have signed the findings, conclusions
and judgment as presented by plaintiff rather than those
granting judgment in .favor of defendant.
In addressing himself to such an argument under his
Argument No. 1, counsel accuses the court of being "very
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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careless in the terminology" used in the findings and conclusions as signed, and throughout his Argument No. 1 as
well as his Arguments Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, counsel tries to
quibble over the use of words and expressions, both as used
in the findings as signed by the court and as used in the statutes under consideration in this case. He criticizes the use of
the expression "conveyed or purported to convey," as well
as the use in the findings of the expression "struck off and
sold." It is the opinion of counsel for the respondent that
in all matters such as involved in this case we must look
to substance rather than to mere form, and quibbling over
the use of words will not assist us much in getting down
to the real meaning of what a court intends in a judgment,
nor of what the legislature may have intended in the enactment of a statute.
Counsel seems to agree with the statement in the findings, as appears in paragraph 9 as signed by the court, that
on November 7, 1941, Salt Lake· County executed and delivered a deed by which it "conveyed or purported to convey"
the property to the defendant. The position of the defendant with respect to the use of such words is that it is immaterial whether or not the conveyance to Irene Hunter
Chamberlain or to the plaintiff actually conveyed a good
title, because regardless of whether such title may have
been good as far as the actual documentary procedure is
concerned, the grantee might still b~ barred by reason of
limitations. The question as to whether or not the deed to
the defendant by which the county conveyed or purported to
convey the property amounted to a good conveyance might
be immaterial if the facts are such that even assuming the
I
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tax deed to be invalid, yet a purported conveyance would give
sufficient color of title upon which adverse possession could
be predicated, which might ripen into a good defense as
against the plaintiff. Therefore, quibbling over the words
"conveyed or purported to convey" does not get us anywhere and does not assist the court.
In paragraph (b) of his Argument 1 on page 19', counsel argues that the treasurer's sale was void for lack of
proper auditor's affidavits, and he states that thus only a
purported sale took place. There was an actual treasurer's
sale which took place. Whether or not it was void because of
some defect in the procedure does not say that there was
no treasurer's sale and does not say that the property was
not sold for unpaid taxes assessed in 1930. There was a treasurer's sale and the property was sold1 but because of some
defect we may admit that the treasurer's sale was void.
The same is true with respect to his argument under
paragraph (d) where he says that the finding that the
defendant purchased the property from the county is not
true. We dispute counsel's statement. The defendant did
purchase the property from the county. The fact that because of some defect in procedure the purchase may be declared void does not enable plaintiff to say that the defendant did not purchase and pay for said property.
In paragraph (e) on page 21 counsel states that the
evidence does not show that defendant negotiated for the
property in the summer of t~941. Perhaps there is not direct
evidence to that effect, but it is inferentially shown because
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the testimony does show that the defendant went onto the
property and built the trackage on it during August of 1941,
and no deed was issued to the property until November 7,
194'1 (Tr. 57). The fact that a deed was subsequently issued
by the county would at least allow the inference that when
the defendant went onto the property and built its trackage
there in August of 1941, there must have been some contact
with the county prior to going onto the property. Whether
that be a fact or not, however, is immaterial and would not
constitute such error as would necessitate reversal or even
serious consideration by this court.
In paragraph (c) of Argument 1, beginning at page
19, counsel criticizes the use by the court of the term "struck
off and sold" to the county. We will refer to this particular
phase of the matter in a later subdivision of this argument,
but here again we think that we must look to the substance
rather than to the mere form and look to what procedure is
required and what is meant, if anything, by the words
"struck off and sold" that may be different as far as procedure is concerned from what -was actually done. Counsel
states that the 1939 legislature completely revised the procedure to foreclose a tax lien and that ·Chapter 101, Laws
of Utah 1939, referred to in the trial court's findings, repealed the provisions relating to the execution of the auditor's tax deed. We must dispute counsel's statement. The
provisions relating to auditor's tax d_eeds were not repealed.
Section 2 of Chapter 101, Laws of 19·39, specifies the sections which were repealed and these were sections relating
to the treasurer's affidavit. The provisions relating to
auditor's tax deeds were not repealed. We will admit that
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the 1939 legislature did reframe some of the wording of
the statute and rearrange some of the sections as regards
material contained therein, but the fundamental procedure
was not substantially changed.
Counsel refers 'to the fact that 'the last nineteen lines
of Section 80-10-66, which provide for the auditor's tax
deed, were deleted in the amended enactment of said section. They were deleted from Section 6.6 but "Section 8010-68 was enacted in its stead," as stated by counsel, and
most of what was contained in those nineteen lines in Section 66 was carried over into Section 68 as amended. (See
subparagraphs ( 5) and ( 6) of Section 68 as contained in .
Utah 'Code Annotated 1943.) The fact that provisions formerly contained in one section may upon amendment be
differently combined in other sections does not necessarily
say that they are changed so that their effect is not the
same. If counsel will read the provisions of Section 80-1068 and compare them with the provisions of the nineteen
lines which he refers to as being deleted from Section 8010-66, he will find that he is in error in his statement that
"not one clause of those nineteen deleted lines mentioned
above was incorporated into 80-10-68, or any subdivision
therein contained."

ARGUMENT NO. 2
TAX TITLE IS DEFECTIVE.
At the outset defendant will admit that by reason of
the failure of the auditor's affidavits to be attached to the
assessment rolls at the time of the tax sale, defendant's tax
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title is defective, and at this juncture we wish to point out
that that is the very reason we are here seeking to apply
the provisions of the statute of limitations as contained in
Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as
Section 104-2~5.10, Utah ·Code Annotated 1943. If the tax
proceedings as had upon this property were not defective,
then the defendant would not be attempting to rely upon
any limitation statute. If the tax title was not defective,
there would be no reason for any attempt to apply the provisions of Section-104-2-5.10 as contained in the 1943! statutes. In fact, if there were no defects in the tax title procedure there would be no necessity whatsoever for the provisions as enacted by the legislature and contained in said
Section 104-2-5.10. The fact that proper procedure had
not been strictly followed in connection with this treasurer's
sale for taxes compels the conclusion that the defendant
did not get a good indefeasible title from the county in its
deed of November 7, 1941. That does not mean, however,
that the defendant cannot claim some rights by virtue of
said deed from Salt Lake County upon which it can base a
possession which will be adverse to the plaintiff and which,
if sufficient time has elapsed, will form an adequate basis
by which defendant can bar plaintiff's right to recover the
property solely upon the basis of adverse possession and
payment of taxes.
The plaintiff cites the case of Anson v. Ellison, 140 P.
2d 65·3-, and states that defendant has no basis to assert
a lien for taxes by virtue of its purchase of the tax title or
for taxes paid to the county. Defendant is not attempting
to claim or assert any lien for such taxes, but defendant will
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not agree with plaintiff's theory that defendant received
absolutely nothing. The defendant did receive a deed from
the county which gave the defendant sufficient color of title
upon which it could base an adverse possession, and with
that color of title the defendant went into possession and
held the possession for sufficient length of time to bar
plaintiff's rights if Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, is applicable to the situation involved herein.
In order to save some argument with plaintiff, we
again repeat that if the tax procedure had been properly
followed and if the tax title were good, defendant then
would have based its defen~e upon that tax title and upon
valid procedure having been taken. The fact that the tax
procedure was not strictly followed and that therefore the
tax title was defective puts defendant in the position where
it must prevail, if at all, upon adverse possession under
the four-year statute. This court has held that a deed from
the county, such as was issued to the defendant in this case,
even though the same be defective, is sufficient to form a
basis for adverse possession from which, if the proper time
has run with the payment of taxes, the one who has held
that possession and paid such taxes can set them up as a
bar against a plaintiff even though the plaintiff may otherwise have a good record title to the property. See W elner
v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490.
If in the Anson case, as cited by plaintifft the plaintiff had secured the same tax title-which was admittedly
invalid-and thereunder had held possesion and paid taxes
for seven years, plaintiff here would not seriously contend
under such circumstances that a good title had not been
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acquired by such adverse possession. Just so in the case
at bar. Even though defendant may have acquired its title
and possession under a defective tax title, a definite provision of our statute of limitations says that if the former
owner should seek to a vail himself of his record title and
attempt to recover the property he m~st do so within four
years, and under such circumstances if he does not do so
within four years he is as effectively barred as he would
be under the provisions of the statute where an adverse
possessor not relying on a tax title has nevertheless held
possession for seven years and paid taxes. At the time of
the Anson case an invalid tax title gave nothing except a
basis upon which one who took possession and paid taxes
for seven years thereafter could perfect a defense against
one seeking to assert a record title. Since that time, however, with the enactment of the 1943 statute, the legislature provided in effect that although seven years are necessary in ordinary adverse possession cases, if the adverse
possession is based upon a defective tax title, then if the
prior record owner wants to avail himself of his good record title he must do so within four years or be barred.

ARGUMENTS NO. 4 AND NO. 5
SE:CTTON 104-2-5.10 AS AMEND·E.D AND SET
FORTH B·Y ·CHAPT1ER 19, LAWS OF UTAH 19·43, IS
APPL]CABLE AND- IS A VERY DEFINITE AND EFFECTIVE B~AR TO PLAINTIFF'S A·CTIO'N HEREIN ..
SE CTION 104-2-5.10 AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
8, LAWS OF UTAH 1947, DiOES NOT APPLY AS A BAR
1
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TO PLAINTIFF'S .A!CTION BUT IS MERELY A C·LARIFICATION OF CHAPTER 19, LAWS OF UT'AH 1943,
SHOWIN·G THAT SAID CHAPTER 19 DOES APPLY TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
1

Defendant is going to change the order of the argument here and argue with respect to plaintiff's point No.
4 ahead of plaintiff's point No. 3, and defendant will combine plaintiff's Arguments Nos. 4 and 5 under this one
heading.
In his argument counsel for appellant gives his own
manufactured designations to various statutory provisions
and refers to different sections as "Auditor's ·Tiax Deed
Statute," "Struck Off and Sold Statute," and "Struck Off
and Sold Limitation Statute." Appellant attacks the finding of the court that the substance of the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, were transferred to and embodied in Section 80-10-68. Under the provisions of Section 80-10-66 as it existed before the 1939·
amendment it was provided :
"If any property sold to the county and not assigned is not redeemed within the time and in the
manner aforesaid, the county recorder shall immediately, upon the expiration of the period of redemption, file the tax-sale record for the year of original
sale with the county auditor, who shall as soon as

may be thereafter make out a deed conveying to the
county all such property, and cause the same to be
recorded in the name of the county." (Italics ours.)
This provision, according to the wording as therein
contained, was not taken verbatim over into the 1'9'3'9 amendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment, and therefore plaintiff's counsel says that we no longer
have an Auditor's Tax Deed Statute. The effect of Section
80-10-68 as amended in 1939 and as carried into the Utah
Code Annotated-1943, while not using the same terminology,
accomplishes the same purpose. Subparagraph (5) of Section 80-10-68 in the 1943 statute provides that deeds issued
by the county auditor must recite the amount of taxes, penalties, etc., as contained in the latter portion of Section 66 ·
as it existed prior to the 1939 amendment, and paragraph
( 5) of Section 68 goes on to provide the form of tax deed
to be issued by the county to a purchaser at the May sale.
Subparagraph (6) of Section 68 then provides:
"Any property offered for sale as aforesaid and
for which there is no purchaser shall be struck off
to the county by the county auditor, who shall publicly declare substantially as follows: 'All property
here offered for sale and which has not been struck
off to a private purchaser is hereby struck off and
sold to the county of_____._________________________________ (naming
the county), and I hereby declare the fee simple title
of said property to be vested in said county.' The
county auditor shall thereupon make an endorsement
opposite each of the entries in the tax sale record
showing the preliminary sale of said property for
delinquent taxes, substantially as follows: 'The fee
simple title to the property described in this entry
was on the _____________________._____________ day of May, 19·__________ , , ·
sold and conveyed to the county of___________________________ _
in payment of general taxes charged against the
same,' and shall sign his riame thereto. The fee simple title to said property shall thereupon vest in the
county. The auditor shall then deposit said tax sale
record with the county recorder and the book shall
thereupon become a part of the official records of
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the recorder and shall be deemed to have been recorded by him. * * *"
Thus the auditor, by endorsement upon the tax sale
record, states and certifies over his signature that the property in question was sold and conveyed to the county, and
the record is then filed with the county recorder and the
title thereupon vests in the county. The certification by the
auditor is that the property was "sold and conveyed to the
county." The effect is the same as formerly when the auditor made a formal auditor's deed conveying the property
to the county, and merely simplified the procedure by having the auditor endorse the fact of such conveyance upon
the tax sale record rather than making a separate deed for
the same, and then filing the tax sale record with the county
recorder as a record of the title's having been sold and conveyed to the county. This distinction in wording and in
effecting the conveyance to the county by endorsement on
the tax sale record rather than by a separate deed is a distinction and a difference in form but not in substance, and
the effect is the same as it was prior to the 193·9 statute,
which is that there is a preliminary sale by the treasurer,
then a May sale, and if property is not purchased by
some outside individual, the auditor conveys the property
to the county.
We insist that the trial court was justified in saying
that the substance of the provisions of 80-10-66- were embodied in Section 80-10-68 as amended by the 1'9·3.9· Laws.
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, provides:
"No action for the recovery of real property
struck off and sold to the county, as provided by secSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion 80-10-6-8 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943~, or for
the possession thereof shall be maintained and no
defense or counter-claim to any action involving the
recovery of property, or the defense of title to property, sold at such tax sale, or public or private sale,
or for possession thereof, shall be set up or maintained, unless the same be brought or set up within
four years from date on which the sale was held.
* * *"
There was a reason why the legislature enacted ~Chapter
19, Laws qf Utah .1943, and it is a well-known principle of
statutory construction that we must assume that the legislature did not do a useless thing and the statute must be
upheld as being valid if possible. The basis of the statute
and the reason for its enactment was not sales that had been
made pursuant to Section 80-10-68 (6), after the amendment
of 1939. The basis and reason for the statute arose long
before that time.
There was a justifiable reason for limiting the period
of adverse possession with respect to property purchased on
tax sales to four years, or some other similar period short
of the usual seven years required in the regular adverse
possession statute. Such shorter period enabled a person
who had bought property from the county after tax sales
which might be questioned to have the assurance that if the
tax title was going to be attacked the prior owner of the
property would have to do so within the four years and he
would thereby not have to wait too long to know whether
his title could be confirmed or whether he might have to
suffer having the property taken a~ay from him.
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At the time of the enactment of Chapter 19, Laws of
Utah 19'43, the 1939 amendment was contained in the 19,43
Code as it had been compiled, and Section 80-10-68 ( 6) contained the substance of the provisions which represented,
if they did not embody verbatim, the provisions which had
theretofore existed in the statutes with respect to tax sales ·
and the conveyance of property by t_he auditor to the county
where such tax sales had not been redeemed. It is true
that ·Chapter 19 refers by specific terms to real property
struck off and sold to the county, "as provided by section
80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated 1943." In construing
what was meant by t_he legislature in enacting this statute
we must consider the reason for the statute and the history
back of it. Counsel argues that this statute refers only to
property which he says was "struck off and sold to the
county" under the provisions of the "Struck Off and Sold
Statute," but could not within reason be considered to include property "conveyed to the county under the Auditor's
Tax Deed Statute." He argues that this property was never
struck off and sold to the county. W-e disagree. It was
sold to the county on the tax sale and it was conveyed to
the county by the auditor's tax deed as effectively and to
all intents and purposes the _same as if the auditor had
endorsed his conveyance upon the tax sale record.
:Counsel argues that the statute does not apply to the
case in question because inasmuch as the tax proceedings
were defective nothing was conveyed to the county. Counsel in effect states that if the tax sales and the auditor's
deed or conveyance to the county all defective, then the
property _is not sold to the county, and where they are thus
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defective and property not sold to the county Chapter 19
does not apply. If all tax proceedings were proper and
valid and the sale to the county a legal sale, we repeat as
hereinabove statedv there would be no purpose whatsoever
in the enactment of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943. The
only possible necessity and the only reason for the enactment of such a statute is to give a basis for confirmation
of tax titles after a lapse of a short period of time in such
instances where the tax sales and the conveyances to the
county are for some reason defective and invalid and subject to being set aside.
Plaintiff's attitude in his brief is the same a~ it was
in the trial court, that there is ambiguity in the statute,
and respondent will agree with him to the extent that there
must be some interpretation by this court and some construction placed upon the statute to find just what was intended by the legislature. The history back of tax titles
within this state, particularly during the 1930's and the
cases decided by this court leave no question at all as to
the reason for the enactment of this statute.
·Counsel for appellant did not see fit to refer to very
much by way· of authority, but respondent would. like to
refer to some cases and authorities that may give some
assistance in construing the intent of the legislature in
enacting the statute in question.

IN·TENT O·F LEGIS.LATURE AND B.A!CKGR·OUND
O·F ·C~IR~CUMST·ANICES FOR'MING BASIS OF AND
NE·CESSITY FOR CH'APTER 19, LAWS OF u·TAH 1943.
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In 50 American Jurisprudence, Section 305, page 291,
it is stated:
"Mischief to Be Prevented or Remedied.-In the
construction of an ambiguous statute it is proper to
take into consideration the particular evils at which
the legislation is aimed or the mischief sought to be
avoided-that is, to the occasion and necessity for
the law, or causes which induced its enactment, as
well as the remedy intended to be afforded and the
result sought to be attained, or the benefits expected
to be derived, where these matters can be legitimately
ascertained. Where possible, the statute should be
given such a construction as, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the evil which the legislature intended to prohibit. Under these rules, a case
which is within the mischief of a statute has been
regarded as within its provisions, and the tendency
has been to so interpret the statute as to embrace all
situations in which the mischief sought to be remedied is found to exist." (Italics ours.)
In considering the background and reasons for the
enactment of the statute as contained in Chapter 19, L,aws
of Utah 1943, we find the following: During the period of
1930 up to the time of this statute, 1943,, and particularly
the period during the depression days, a lot of property
had gone to tax sale and to tax deed in all of the counties
within the State of Utah, but in many if not most instances
proper steps had not been taken by the various counties,
even under the statutory provisions then existing, so as to.
enable the counties to acquire good titles to these tax properties. This court held that in some instances the title of
the county was not good because the auditor's affidavits
had not been attached, as in the case at bar. In other inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stances advertising of the May sale had not been published
for the full length of time determined necessary. Because
of these and other defects the counties could not dispose
of such properties to advantage because it became a matter
of common knowledge that a tax title could be upset. Yet
in spite of this a lot of the properties had been sold to the
county, auditor's deeds had been issued to the county, the
property had been conveyed or struck off to the county, and
such properties had stood in the name of the county on the
county records so that further tax revenue could not be
received therefrom, and people, standing in a position formerly and now held by plaintiff and its predecessors, stood
by disregarding their tax obligations to the sovereign tax
power.
The case at bar is a good and flagrant example of the
very thing that happened in numerous instances. 'The original tax sale was made in 1930 and although neither plaintiff nor any of its predecessors has made any move to pay
such taxes to the county or redeem the property from the
county, it is still trying to recover the property because
there has been some increase in its value because of an inflation that has existed over the country, and now seeks
to defeat the statute and recover the property in spite of
the fact that nineteen years have elapsed without any pretense on its part of recognizing the sovereign tax power
or attempting to pay or redeem the property from any of
the taxes assessed.
As was said by the court in the case of Towson v. Denson, 86 S. W. 661 :
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"The right of the state to have its taxes promptly paid is as important as the right of the individual
to be protected in his property. T'axes are the price
paid for such protection. Those only who have color
of title obtain rights of possession under the act.
And he who claims to be the real owner can prevent
this by himself paying taxes or taking actual possession of a~d improving the lands."
Under conditions as they existed in the State of Utah
prior to 1943 people in a position such as plaintiff and its
predecessors felt that they could rely on recovering their
properties at any time they so chose even though the properties had gone to tax sale and been conveyed or struck off
to the county. They felt there was no necessity of going into
possession of their lands and paying their taxes to the
county, and even felt there was not much need for worry
if someone else purchased these lands from the county and
improved them. All they were concerned about was that
if someone else purchased and improved and paid taxes on
the property, they could step in just shortly before the
seven-year period of adverse possession had run and they
could then reclaim and take possession of the property. It
is for this very reason that the statute. as contained in ~chap
ter 19,· Laws of Utah 1943", was passed-to stabilize these
tax titles and to give both the county and the purchaser
something they could rely on. The upholding of such a law
would enable the county to dispose of such properties and
to recover some of the tax monies due it, as has been done
in the case at bar. The defendant paid all of the taxes that
were assessed or would have been assessed during the time
the county held the property as a part of the purchase price
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and has paid all taxes since. The statute gave a basis of
assurance to a purchaser, who paid these. tax monies to the
county, that if his title in the property was not 'good the
former owner would have to attack it within four years,
and if not attacked within four years, such purchaser could
rest secure in the knowledge that his title and possession
could not thereafter be disturbed.
If this was not the purpose and effect of Chapter 19,
Laws of Utah 1943, then it had no purpose and was without
effect whatsoever. The law does not do a useless thing and
does not consider that the State Legislature would pass a
useless act.
There is a justifiable reason for making a separate provision in the limitations statutes with respect to such tax
titles and the majority of states have at one time or another
made such separate provision for such tax titles. The State
of Oklahoma in 1919 passed a statute confirming such tax
titles after six months. This was amended in 192·3 extending the period to twelve months, but provided that a prior
owner, if he sought to· avoid or set aside a tax deed which
had been purchased on resale from the county, must do so
within twelve months. In discussing the question and the
reason for the statute the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in
Swan v. Kuehner, 10 P. 2d 7·07, stated :

"* * * 'It had become proverbial that a tax
title was no title at all, and a sale for taxes was as
near mockery as any proceeding having the appearance of legal sanction could be. The principal cause
was the difficulty in proving the various steps essential to the validity of such a sale.' * * * and
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that it was necessary that some additional inducement be offered to the purchase of land offered for
sale at a tax resale.
"* * * The 1923 act shows a clear legislative intent to limit the time during which a former
owner of real estate may commence an actio~ to avoid
or set aside a resale tax deed to one year. * * *
"The 1923 act (section 6) provides that'* * *
such notice and return shall be presumptive evidence
of the regularity, legality and validity of all the official acts leading up to such resale.' That presumption may be rebutted by the former owner or owners
of the land in an action to avoid or set aside the deed
commenced within one year after the recording of
the deed; but at the expiration of one year the pre..;
sumption becomes conclusive. The former owner has
a right, for one year after the date of the recording
of the resale tax deed, to commence an action for the
purpose of rebutting the presumption created by the
legislative authority. The length of time is reasonable. The legislative power to provide for the issuance of a tax deed is the legislative power to provide
a limited period in which the presumptions arising
from the execution, acknowledgment, delivery, and
recording of a resale tax deed may be rebutted, and
the legislative power to provide that after the expiration of that period the presumptions may not be
rebutted. * * * 'It is immaterial whether the
sale and the deed be void or valid. It is sufficient.
that a sale has been made, and the deed recorded, to
bring the statute into activity, and, after the lapse
of the period limited, to entitle the purchaser, and
those claiming under him, to its protection.' * * *"
(Italics ours.)
It will be noted that the Oklahoma statute sets up presumptions as to the validity of the tax proceedings, just as the
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Utah statute does. (See Section 80-10-68 (7), Utah Code
1

Annotated 1943) .
In that Oklahoma case the trial court held for the plaintiff but the Supreme :Court said the one year limitation sta~
ute applied and reversed the trial court, saying :

"* * * The action of the plaintiff was not
commenced within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations for the commencement
of such an action. The trial court should have so
held and should have denied the plaintiff the relief
sought."
A similar statute in the State of Montana was involved
in the case of Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Worranty Title
Co., 134 P. 302. In that case the defendant did not seasonably enter the plea of the statute of limitations and the
Supreme ~Court of Montana, while holding that if the plea
had been seasonably interposed it would have been a sufficient defense, nevertheless held that being a plea of stat- .
ute of limitations it was a matter which could be waived
and if not waived, must be asserted, and that under the circumstances in that case the defendant had delayed so long
in interposing the plea of the statute that the trial court
was considered as not having abused his discretion in refusing to allow an amendment to set up the plea. It is interesting to note that in the Montana case there is an argument similar to the one urged by plaintiff in the trial court
in this case wherein plaintiff said that it was not seeking
to recover the property or possession thereof, but merely to
quiet title to the property and that therefore our 1943 stat-
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ute does not apply. With respect to a similar contention
the Montana court said :
"Respondent makes the suggestion that the statute applies only to actions 'to set aside or annul a tax
deed'; that this is not such an action, but one to quiet
title merely, hence the statute does not apply. In
other words, a plaintiff seeking, in fact, to destroy
the effect of a tax deed must confront the statute if
he assail the tax deed as such, but, designing to accomplish precisely the same thing, he may avoid the
statute by calling his action one to quiet title, declaring upon his ownership generally and demanding
that his adversary appear and plead the tax deed.
This is surely a subordination of substance to form;
a thing is not changed by changing its name. Where
the sole object of an action is to get rid of a tax deed
as a claim of title adverse to the plaintiff, we see no
reason why it is not as much an action to_ annul or set
aside such deed as though expressly so designated."
The court went on to state with respect to the action there
involved that under the authorities, "* * * that this
action as it finally exhibits itself in the agreed statement
of facts is subject to the limitational provisions of the
statute in question." The court nevertheless upheld the
trial court in refusing to allow the plea of the statute to be
invoked at an extremely late date.
An early case involving such a statute is the case of
Walker v. Boh, (Kans.) 4 P. 272. In that case it was the
holder of the tax title who sought to quiet the title as against
the former owner and that was one of the early cases involving a statute similar to our 1943 statute that confirms
the wording of our statute as being one that may be used
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"as a shield but not as a sword." In that case the defect
was that proper notice of the tax sale had not been published, but inasmuch as the holder of the tax title, who was
out of possession, was the one seeking to invoke the aid of
the statute, the Kansas court held that the statute did not
apply in his favor. The statute in that case read:
"Any suit or proceeding against a tax purchaser,
his heirs or assigns, for the recovery of land sold for
taxes, or to defeat or avoid a sale or conveyance of
land .for taxes, except in cases where the taxes have
been paid on the land redeemed as provided by law,
shall be commenced within five years from the time
of recording the tax deed, and not thereafter."
The Kansas court in that case said:
"Now, it may be that this limitation has so run
in favor of the plaintiff's tax deed that no person
could maintain an action against him for the recovery
of the land, or to defeat or avoid his tax deed. But
this is not such an action. This is not an action
'against' the plaintiff, but it is an action brought by
himself and in his own favor; nor is it an action
brought to recover the land, or to defeat or avoid
the tax deed, but it is an action simply to quiet title,
upon the assumption that the tax deed is valid, and
virtually to bolster up and sustain the tax deed; the
defendant is simply defendant, and is not asking for
any affirmative relief. Now, it does not seem that
this limitation reaches any such case as this. The
statute seems to be enacted to prevent persons from
instituting proceedings to defeat or avoid tax deeds
after the five years have elapsed, but it does not
seem to be enacted for the purpose of preventing persons from defending· their rights when attacked. Mter the five-years limitation has run, the holder of
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the tax deed may unquestionably retain all that he is
in the possession of under his tax deed, but he must
not commence an action to obtain something more
without being prepared to meet any defense which
the defendant may set up."
If the plaintiff were in possession of the property in
question here and defendant had acquired a tax deed, then
plaintiff may logically argue that it was merely suing toremove a cloud from its title, but the statute in question was
designed absolutely to protect a purchaser of a tax title
from the county who had gone into possession of property
and to prevent the former owner from instituting proceedings on an affirmative basis to recover title or possession
or to take anything away from the tax deed holder that he
had acquired by virtue of that tax deed.
In view of the foregoing we feel that further reference
to the intent of the legislature in enacting Chapter 19, Laws
of 1943, would be proper.
Sutherland on Statutory .Construction, ·Third Edition,
Volume 2, Section 4506, page 322, has the following to say
with respect to legislative intent:
"If legislative intent has meaning for the interpretative process it means not a collection of subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of individuals, but
rather the objective footprints left on the trail of
legislative enactment. Legislative intent can't be
'dreamed up'. It can be speculated about; but it can
be discovered only by facutal inquiry into the history
of the 'enactment of the statute, the background circumstances which brought the problem before the
legislature."
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The "background circumstances" which brought the
problem before the legislature were not the titles· based
upon Section 80-10-68 ( 6), as amended by the 1939· statute,
but it was the fact that numerous tax titles based upon procedure prior to 1939 had been declared to be invalid because
the procedure set up in the statute had not been strictly followed, as a result of which a large amount of property had
gone off the tax rolls, and this was a means of confirming
titles in individuals who purchased tax titles without waiting the full seven years.
With respect to interpretation, Sutherland, Volume 2,
Section 4·505, page 321, also states as follows:

"* * * But as all future circumstances cannot be anticipated by even the most farsighted legislator the function of judicial interpretation cannot
be completely avoided. When such a circumstance
arises certainly the safest starting point for interpretation will be the statute itself. But it is by no
means the safest st~pping point. Before the true
meaning of the statute can be determined consideration must be given to the problem in society to which
the legislature addressed itself, prior legislative consideration of the problem, the legislative history of
the statute under litigation, and to the operation and
administration of the statute prior to litigation."
(Italics ours.)
Again we insist it was to perfect tax titles by limitation
so as to get property back on the tax rolls that formed the
basis of this 19-43 statute.
Another means of construction which is used by courts,
as indicated in the last paragraph just quoted, is that the
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court must consider "the legislative history of the statute
under litigation." The s~atute in question was amended in
1947, and by the 1947 amendment the legislature very clearly pointed out that it intended the statute to cover not only
the specific section as quoted, being "section 80-10-68 (6) ,"
but also property "conveyed to the county prior to September 1, 1939 by auditor's deed under the provisions of section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933."
Amendatory acts can be very helpful in explaining
and construing the ·intent of the legislature at the time it
enacted the original act. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Volume 1, Section 1929, page 410, says:
I

"* * * The object in construing an amendatory act is to determine the legislative intent * * *
The amendment will be given a reasonable construction; a literal construction which would lead to absurd consequences will be avoided. When the intent
of the legislature is not clear from its language the
court will consider surrounding circumstances."
And again in Section 1931, page 416, the same authority states:
"Since an amendment changes an existing statute the general rule of statutory interpretation that
the surrounding circumstances are to be considered
is particularly applicable to the interpretation of
amendatory acts. The original act or section and
conditions thereunder must be looked at. Judicial or
executive interpretation of the original act especially must be considered. The court will determine
what defects existed in the original act, which defect the legislature intended to cure, and then construe the amendment so as to reduce or eliminate the
defect intended to be remedied.
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"If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a
legislative interpretation of the original act-a formal change-!f'ebutting the presumption of substantial change." (Italics ours.)
Volume 2, Section 5110, page 526, states:
"Where a former statute is amended, or a doubtful meaning of a former statute rendered certain by
subsequent legislation a number of courts have held
that such amendment or recent legislation is strong
evidence of what the legislature intended by the first
statute. * * *

"* * * Where the original law was subject
to very serious doubt, by permitting subsequent
amendments to control the former meaning a great
deal of uncertainty in the law is removed. And the
legislature is probably in the best position to ascertain the most desirable construction. In addition it
is just as probable that the legislature intended to
clear up uncertainties, as it did to change existing
law where the former law is changed in only minor
details. In People v. Davenport (91 N.Y. 574) where
the New York court has established a test that is
highly satisfactory, it was stated, 'The force which
should be given to subsequent, as affecting prior legislation, depends largely upon the circumstances under which it takes place. If it follows immediately
and after controversies upon the use of doubtful
phraseology therein have arisen as to the true construction of the prior law it is entitled to great
weight. * * *" (Italics ours.)
After the enactment of Chapter 19, of the 1943 Laws,
there were controversies which arose as to whether by mentioning Section 80-10-68 ( 6) the legislature intended to
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limit the statute to apply only to tax titles arising after the
amendment of 1939, or whether the period of limitation as
contained in Chapter 19 was intended to apply to all tax
titles in connection with which there may be some defect
so that by a shorter period of limitation the property might
be put back on the tax rolls. Because these controversies
arose and because there was some discussion of it among
members of the bar, the draftsmen who drafted the original
1943 statute prepared and submitted the 1947 amendment.
The 1947 amendment itself, therefore, is strong evidence
of the intent of the legislature and shows that the legislature
intended for the 1943 law to cover all void tax titles and
limit the period during which an action could be brought
by the former owner to four years. The amendments to
other sections as contained in chapters 18 and 20 of the 1943
laws very strongly confirm that this was the intent of the
legislature.
A matter simila.r to the one involved in the case at bar
was before the federal court in the case of United States
v. Perkins, Secretary of Labor, 17 F. Supp. 17'7. An early
statute affecting the citizenship of a minor provided that
where the minor had alien parents, upon naturalization of
or resumption of American citizenship "by the parent", the
minor would automatically become an American citizen. In
construing what was meant by the words "by the parent",
it was argued very forcibly that a mother was not included
in the words, the mother's domicile following that of the
father the father was the one to be considered as the parent
involved in that action. The act was subsequently amended
by Congress and in the amended act it was provided that
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upon "the naturalization of or resumption of American
citizenship by the father or the mother" a minor would
automatically become an American citizen. The Federal
District ·Court in and for the District of ·Columbia in applying the earlier act held that the subsequent amendment was
merely a legislative interpretation of what Congress had
intended by the original act. The· court stated :
"I think that the amended act was passed not to
change the former law but to clarify it, by expressing more clearly the intent of Congress. It is true
of course that an act passed for the purpose of clarifying a former act does not change the law as it had
theretofore existed, and could not divest parties of
rights which had been acquired under the original
act, * * *"
Although the prior act was the one which it was argued
applied to the case, the court concluded:
"I think that under the law petitioner became
naturalized citizen upon the resumption of citizenship by his mother."

a

A similar problem came before the Supreme Court of
Iowa in the case of Rural Independent School District v.
New Independent School District, 94 N. W. 284. That case
involved a school township as distinguished from an independent school district or distinct school corporation. Originally the school districts were organized upon a township
.basis and the general school law referred to a "school township." The general school law was amended from time to
time and carried forward the phraseology ''school township." However, other legislation authorized the creation of
independent school districts as separate, independent cor-
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porations, formed on a different basis than the original
school townships. The court in that case observed:

"* * * In other. words, it seems that when
rural independent districts were created the general
language of the school law, as it existed at the time, ,
and was subsequently re-enacted with reference to
the formation of the territory of cities, towns, or
villages into independent districts, was not changed
to correspond. * * *"
The case arose because of the question of the different
terminology as used in the seperate statutes, but the court
went on to say after referring to the changes in the general
school law:

"* * * Under these circumstances, we are
justified in taking into consideration the general legislative purpose, and giving it effect, even though
we are required thereby to extend or curtail the language used in some portions of the statute. The rule
that a statute cannot be extended by construction so
as to cover a casus omissus is recognized in the criminal law, but not in the interpretation of remedial
statutes." (Italics ours.)
Because of the controversy which arose in the School
District case the legislature amended the statute while the
matter was in litigation and with respect thereto the high
court said:
"Since the proceedings involved in this case were
commenced, the Legislature has amended Code, Section 2794, so as to make it directly applicable to such
a case as the one now before us * * * ; and
counsel for plaintiff contends that this legislative
recognition of the necessity for an amendment in
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order to cover such a case is an admission that previously the statute did not cover the case. We need
not, however, assume to be so ignorant of the methods of legislation as to profess not to know that a
statute may be insufficient in its language to carry
out the legislative intent, and that when difficulties
arise in its interpretation the Legislature is likely to
change the language so as to make its application
clear in other cases, even ·though the amendment
could not be effective as to the case in which the difficulty has arisen. It is quite as likely that the language of the amendment was intended to make the
statute correspond to what had previously been supposed or assumed to be the law as that it was thereby
intended to change the general intent and purpose of
the law." (Italics ours.)
The high court then concluded:
"Our conclusion is that to carry out the legislative intent found in Code, Section 2794, reading it in
the light of the history of the· school legislation and
contemporaneous provisions of the school law, we
should consider 'school township,' in that section, as
'school corporation,' and thus find that, as originally
enacted in the Code of 1897, its meaning was the
same as that whick is now expressly declared by act
of the Twenty-Ninth General Assembly." (Italics
ours.)
In the case of School District No. 18 v. Pondera County,
297 P. 4·98, the Supreme .court of Montana had a similar
question before it, and the particular statute there in question involved the collection and apportionment of taxes between a county and a school district. Counsel for plaintiff
and appellant will find the use of the words "struck off"
somewhat involved in that Montana case, and "sold to the
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county" is also somewhat involved. In that case the Montana court in part held:
"Under the authorities cited, the construction of
section 2234 asked by the county, strictly according
to its letter, would condemn the provision as unconstitutional, while under that contended for by the
school district the act will be valid. If a statute is
capable of two constructions, one of which will condemn it as unconstitutional while the other will preserve it, it is the duty of this court to give to the
statute that construction which will vitalize it. * * *
"'It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within
the letter of a statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers' (Holy Trinity ·Church v. United States,
143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 512, 36 L. Ed. 226), and
'a thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers' (Riggs v. Palmer, 11 5 N. Y. 506,
509, 22 N. E. 188, 189, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St.
Rep. 819). There is a presumption existing against
the construction of a statute which would render it
ineffective, inefficient, or which would cause grave
public injury, as well as where it would render. the
statute unconstitutional. Bird v. United States, 187
U. S. 124, 23 S. ,Ct. 42, 47 L. Ed. 100."
1

In the case at bar the construction contended for by
plaintiff and appellant, which would strictly limit the application of 'Chapter 19 of Laws of 194"3- to tax titles arising
upon sales made pursuant to and after the 1939 amendment, would render the statute "ineffective, inefficient,
and would cause grave public injury." Such a construction
would not assist the county in getting property back on
the tax rolls.
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There. is another point to be considered here. If the
construction contended for by appellant with reference to
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, should be adopted by this
court then it would compel a holding by this court that
Chapter 8, Laws of 1947 is unconstitutional, whereas if the
theory contended for by respondent should be adopted by
the court, there would be no necessity for the court to declare :Chapter 8 of Laws of 1947 unconstitutional. Chapter
8 of Laws of Utah 1947 was enacted by the legislature
merely to clarify and show what was actually intended by
it in Chapter 19 of Laws of 1943. :Chapter 8 did not have
a saving clause providing that an action could be maintained or defense set up within four years from the effective date of the act. If there is no saving clause such a
statute cannot be applied immediately. There must be some
reasonable lapse of time allowed during which the prior
owner can bring his action or set up his defense. This saving clause was included in Chapter 19, Laws of 1943, and
if this chapter is given effect with respect to all.defective
tax titles so as to limit the period to four years from and
after the effective date of the act, then there is no necessity
for a saving clause with respect to ·Chapter 8, Laws of 1947,
because Chapter 19, Laws of 1943 would take care of the
four-year period and would be a bar to actions or defenses
brought or set up by prior owners, and Chapter 8 as set
forth in the 19·4-7 statutes then would need to be applied
only to sales which may be made on or after the effective
date of such act. Thus by construing the 1947 amendment
as contained in Chapter 8 to be merely a legislative interpretation of the intent of the legislature when it enacted
1
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Chapter 19, we would have a construction which would
save the constitutionality and make effective both statutes.
In the Pondera case the Montana court went on to say :
"So, here, the statute under consideration can
be rendered effective and constitutional by declaring
that the provision as to the division of interest and
penalties therein provided for applies only to amounts
collected on the payment of delinquent taxes levied
for state and county purposes, and does not apply to
payments made in connection with taxes levied for
the support of other bodies politic. As stated in H·oly
Trinity 'Church v. United States, above: 'This is not
the substitution of the will of the judge for that of
the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include any act in question, and yet a consideration of
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results
which follow from giving such broad meaning to the
words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.'
"But it is urged that, because section 2234 was
amended in 1929~ to read as we now interpret the
section, we must presume that a change in the law
was made, and that, originally, it did not so provide,
citing 36 Cyc. 116·5. Like most rules, the rule that
a change in the law is presumed from the fact of
amendment has its exceptions, among which is the
rule that the presumption falls when its indulgence
would violate a constitutional provision or the intention of the Legislature * * * an~ a change in
a statute may be made merely to express more clearly
the original intention of the Legislature (State ex
rei. Rankin v. Wibaux County Bank, 85 Mont. 532,
281 P. 341). Thus an amendment to a statute mak-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

ing it directly applicable to a particular case is not
necessarily an admission on the part of the Legislature that it did not originally cover such a case.
Rural Independent School District v. New Independent School District, 120 Iowa 119, 9·4 N. W. 284.
"Here a reasonable inference from the fact of
amendment is that * * * the Legislature expressed more clearly its original intention * * *
and, because of what is heretofore said, we now hold
that such was the intention of the Legislature concerning, and the effect of, section 223 4 before amendment."
1

Sutherland on Statutory Construction, ·Third Edition,
Volume 2, Section 4·503, page 319, states:
"Inasmuch as the court cannot escape the consequence that its determination will affect the meaning of the statute, it would appear to be a more appropriate exercise of the judicial function if the
court would face the difficult task and at the risk
of being wrong, determine as best it can what the
legislature intended. If the court decides incorrectly,
the legislature may at succeeding sessions correct the
error. If it decides correctly, it will have saved the
expense and burden of the legislative process and
will have given judicial relief to those who were in
·the beginning entitled to it."
We think there would be no question but what if the
construction as contended for by appellant were given 'to
Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, it would necessitate further
action on behalf of the legislature, and the matter would be
so amended in the next legislature as to still shorten the
period of limitations during which prior owners could attack defective tax titles in order to enable counties within

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

the State of Utah to maintain and replace these properties
on their tax rolls to receive the tax revenue they are entitled to therefrom.
In finding a basis to construe the intent of the legislature we are not left solely to text statements and cases from
other jurisdictions. This court has given us very definite
rules by which we can arrive at a proper construction of
such a statute as the one involved in Chapter 19, Laws of
Utah 1943. In the case of Norville v. Tax Commission, 98
Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 9'3!7, this court went to considerable
length in setting forth the basis of proper construction of
such tax statutes. We quote the following exerpts from that
case:
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are
presumed to be constitutional and valid. ('Cases
cited.) When there is ambiguity in the terms of a
statute or when it is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it unconstitutional
and the other would bring it within constitutional
sanctions, the court is bound to choose that interpretation which would uphold the statute. * * *
(Cases cited.) "
While it was not involved nor directly stated in that case a
similar rule has been announced many times that where
a statute may be susceptible of two interpretations, one of
which would give it effect and the other would show it ·to
be an entirely useless and ineffective piece of paper, that
construction which would give some meaning and effect
to the statute would be adopted. In the Norville case the
court goes on to state:
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"The duty of this court in construing and interpreting legislative acts is to give effect to the intent
of the legislature. (Cases cited.)
"As stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 241, at p. 320: 'In the exposition of a statute the intention of the law-maker will prevail over
the literal sense of the terms; and its reason and
intention will prevail over the strict letter. When
the words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the context; from the occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason
and good discretion.'
"In Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S.
455, 54 S. Ct. 806, 809, 78 L. Ed. 13:61, the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed what it said in
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 43 S. Ct. 65,
67 L. Ed. 199: 'We may then look to the reason of
the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history
and give it effect in accordance with its design and
purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.'
1

"See also State v. Livingston Concrete Bldg. &
Mfg. Co., 34 Mont. 57·0, 87 P. 980, 9 Ann. Cas. 204,
and Territory ex rei. Sampson v. ·Clark, supra (2
Okl. 82, 35 P. 883) , wherein the Court said : 'When
the intention (of the legislature) can be gathered
from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or
supplied to give to the enactment the force and effect
which the legislature intended.' (Italics ours.)
"* * *
"The general rule of construction of ambiguous
words in a statute is stated in 3 A. L. R. 404: 'Where
words have been omitted from a statute or an ordinance by inadvertence or through a clercial error,
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and the intent of the legislature is ascertainable from
the context, the court will insert the words necessary
to carry out that intent. Courts will not permit an
act to be declared invalid for uncertainty, where
reason demands the insertion of words therein.'
1

"See annotations there given. In Chez ex rel.
Weber College v. Utah State Building Commission,
93 Utah 538, 74 P. 2d 687, 692, this court held that
'words which are obviously necessary to complete
the sense (of a statute) will be supplied to effect a
meaning clearly shown by other part~ of the statute.' "
A meaning clearly shown by other parts of the statute is
adequately supplied and confirmed by the provisions of
Chapters 18 and 20, Laws of 1943.
It would not need any supplying of additional words to
show that Section 80-10-66· was intended to be covered by
the legislature because a comparison of the two sections
shows that 80-10-68 ( 6) embodies the provisions covering
real property sold and conveyed to the county or real property struck off and sold to the county as they were originally
contained in 80-10-66. Therefore, real property that is sold
and conveyed by auditor's deed to the county as provided
by Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of 1933, is real property struck off and sold to the county and conveyed to the
county by auditor's endorsement on the tax sale record as
provided by Section 80-10-68 (6), Utah Code Annotated
1943.
By giving proper construction to the statute in question and considering the remedy sought to be effected by
the statute, there is no question but what it was directly
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intended to cover a situation such as the one involved in this
case at bar and could have no other purpose.

ARG·UMiENTS NO. 3 AN·D NO. 6
PLAIN:T'IFF'S ACTION IS AND .WAS BARRE,D B·Y
THE PROVISIO·NS O·F SECTI~ON 104-2-5, UTAH :CQ!DE
ANNOTAT'ED 1943, AS AMENDED BY ·CHAPTER 18,
L.A WS OF UT'AH 1943.
P'LAINIT'IFF'S. ACTION IS BARRED BY THE PROV1ISIO·NS. 0'F SECTION 104-2-6, U'TAH C:ODE ANN;OTATED 19'43, AS AMENDED BY C'HAPTE·R 20, LAWS
OF UTAH 1943.
Sections 104-2-S and 104-2-6, Utah ·Code Annotated
1943, refer specifically to actions involving adverse possession of realty. Originally Section 5 provided that no action
should be brought for the possession of realty unless it appeared that the plaintiff o;r predecessor was seized or possessed of the property within seven years. Section 6 as
originally contained in the 1943 ·Code is a little broader and
states that no cause of action or defense or counterclaim
founded on the title or rents or profits out of the same shall
be effectual unless the person urging the cause of action or
defense, or predecessor, was seized or possessed of the property within seven years. By Chapter 18 and Chapter 20,
Laws of 19·43 the legislature in effect repeated these provisions with respect to seisin and possession of the property
and adverse possession, but in each instance added a provision which stated that where tax titles were involved and
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where the property ·involved was held by another under
tax deed, then the plaintiff or the one urging the cause of
action or defense must show that he or his predecessor in
interest was seized or possessed of the property within four
years. THESE TWO CHAPTERS SH·O·W VERY DiE FINITELY TH·E INT'ENT O·F THE LE'GISLATURE TO MAKE
A SHORTER PERIOD OF LIMIT'ATION FO·R AD·VERS.E
POSSESSION WHERE ONE GOES INTO P088ESSIO·N
UNDER A TAX TITLE.
Appellant in his Argument No. 3 states that these sections cannot apply because if one can show a legal record
title as plaintiff does here, even though the property is possessed by another, that such possession or occupation of the
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title unless it shall
appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely for seven years.
•
This presumption is not a conclusive presumption but
is merely a presumption that possession will follow the
legal title unless there is evidence to the contrary, and if·
there is evidence to the contrary, then such presumption
will not and cannot be invoked. Section 104-2-5- says that
one seeking to recover the property cannot maintain such
an action "unless it appears" that he or his ancestor was
seized or possessed of the property within seven years.
Neither the plaintiff nor its predecessors, according to stipulated facts in the record, was seized or possessed of this
property at any time after March, 193.6, and the action in
question was not filed until substantially more than eleven
years later.
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What is meant by the words "seized or possessed"?
"Possessed" is defined by Webster as, "To occupy in person; to have as occupant, to have and hold." This definition
was adopted and used by the. Supreme Court of Texas in
Evans v. Foster, 15 S. W. 170 ..
In Fuller v. Fuller (Me.) 24 A. 946, the court said:
"According to etymology the word possession
means to sit upon, hence to occupy in person.''
In the case of Hoysradt v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 151 F. at
page 330, the Federal Court said:
"In the primary and most familiar sense of the
word 'occupy' it is the equivalent to the word 'possess'."
"Seisin" is defined by Webster as, "Possession or corporal ppssession; the act of taking possession.''
At early common law a landlord or seller would take
a tenant or purchaser onto the land and there hand him a
branch or handful of soil, thereby giving him as near as
could be possible the actual possession of the land. This was
termed livery of seisin, and the tenant or purchaser would
thereafter remain on the land and be considered as seized
thereof.
In the case of Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cannon, 46
F. 224, the F'ederal Court said :
"The term 'seised' is equivalent to the term
'possessed.' 'Seisin' means 'possession'."
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Bragg v. Wiseman, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 90:
"In the common law seisin signified possession."

Webb v. Wheeler, (Neb.) 114 N. W. 636; Finlay v.
Stevens, 36 A. 2d 767 :
"Seisin means a claim of title accompanied with
possession."

Mercer County State Bank of Manhaven v. Hayes, (N.
D.) 159- N. W. 74:
"Seisin implies possession. It is possession with
a legal right to the estate in the land."

Woolfolk v. Buehner, (Ark.) 55 S. W. 168:
"Seisin and possession are synonymous meaning that possession which is held under claim of
title."

Ft. Dearborn Lodge I. 0. 0. F. v. Klein, (Ill.) 3 N. E.
272:

"Seisin means possession with the intentio:p of
asserting a claim to a freehold estate in the premises."

Altschiel v. O'Neill, (Ore.) 58 P. 9S; Hess v. Hess,
(Ore.) 91 P. 2d 850:
"Seisin may be defined to be a possession of
land under a claim either express or implied by law
of an estate amounting at least to a freehold."

Ford v. Garner's Adm., 49 Ala. 601; Mellenthin v.
Brantman, (Minn.) 1 N. W. ·2'd 141:
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''Under our law the word seisin has no accurately defined meaning; at common law it imported a
feudal investiture of title by actual possession. We
say it has the force of possession under some legal
title or right to hold."
The record clearly shows that neither the plaintiff
nor any predecessor in interest held or ·occupied or had
possession of any of this property at any time since 1936,
eleven years prior to the commencement of this action.
Plaintiff does not even seek to deny that. Plaintiff merely
asserts that it and its predecessor were seized by virtue of
holding the paper record title.
In the case of Towson v. Denson, 86 S. W. 661, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas had a statute somewhat similar
to the one involved here in issue before it and that court
held that a mere constructive possession was not "seisin"
within the meaning of that State's l{irby's Digest, Section
5061, which provided that no action for the recovery of
lands sold for taxes should be maintained against the purchaser unless the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest was
seized or possessed of the lands within two years next before the commencement of the action.
·Clearly, in the case at bar, neither the plaintiff nor
any ancestor, grantor or predecessor in interest was seized
or. possessed of the property in question within seven years
before the commencement of this action and the evidence
before this court shows that fact affirmatively and the
presumption of possession following the record title there. fore falls and Section 104-2-5 is a bar to plaintiff's action
herein.
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Thus under the provisions of Section 104-2-5, such
section would have been a bar to plaintiff's action even
prior to the amendment of 1943- as contained in Chapter 18,
Laws of Utah 1943. Under the provisions of said ·Chapter
18 the period is reduced to four years, and it cannot be disputed that neither plaintiff nor its predecessors was seized
or possessed of the property within four years prior to com_mencement of plaintiff's action herein.
1

With respect to plaintiff's argument that one holding
possession adversely is presumed to hold under and in subordination of the legal title, our only answer is that this
court has held contrary to plaintiff's contention.
The case of Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490,
will be instructive and helpful at this point.

"* * *
* * * held

The respondent Amanda Stearns
the legal or paper title to the lots,
and, so far as appears, never was in actual occupancy
thereof. In 18~1 or 189-2 she ceased to pay taxes on
the lots, and they were sold to Salt Lake county for
the unpaid taxes for the years of 1892 and 1893.
After the four-year redemption period had elapsed,
and Almanda Stearns had failed and neglected to redeem the lots from the tax sale, a tax deed, which
purported to convey them to Salt Lake county, was
duly issued, and delivered to it, in August, 1898. The
undisputed evidence shows that in the spring of 1899
appellant took actual possession of all of the lots in
controversy. * * * After appellant had gone
into possession, as aforesaid, and before the county
delivered a deed to him, he paid to it all of the taxes,
including costs that had accrued, against the lots,
and which had remained unpaid, commencing with
the year 1891 or 1892 and up to and including the
year 1898, the year when the tax deed was issued
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to Salt Lake county, and, in consideration of the payment of the taxes and costs, Salt Lake county, in
May, 1900, made and delivered a deed conveying the
property to him. * * *"
Appellant continued in possession after the county deeded
to him and paid all taxes up to .the time of the trial. This
court after reviewing the facts and circumstances stated:
"In our judgment, the whole question hinges
upon whether the appellant had acquired title to the
lots in controversy by adverse possession."
In the case at bar we admit that defendant cannot prove
a good tax title, and ther~fore the question is whether the
defendant can prevail upon the basis of adverse possession
under the four-year statute as contained in ·chapter 19,
Laws of Utah 1943.
In the Stearns case it was admitted by the respondent
that the appellant's possession was adverse-at' least from
the time he obtained his deed from Salt Lake 'County-but
it was contended that seven years had not elapsed after that
time up to the filing of the original action. ·This court further stated:

"* * * The county had obtained a tax deed
as early as August, 1898. The county's tax title, although defective, was in no way related to or based
upon the title of Almanda Stearns. Under our statute, as under most of the state statutes of the Union,
the tax sale initiates a new title, and has no relation
with the previous chain of title. 37 ·Cyc. 1473. When
the period of redemption had expired and the tax
deed had issued, the county thereafter held under a
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tue of such new title was, prima facie at least, adverse to the original title. * * * In view, therefore, that by the tax deed a new title was ereated,
there can be no presumption that the possession of
appellant was in subordination of Almanda Stearns'
title. This presumption was fully met and destroyed
by reason of the foregoing circumstances. * * *"
(Italics ours.)
The same would be true in the case at bar. The presumption that defendant held possession under and in subordination to plaintiff's legal title was fully met and destroyed by reason of the circumstances set forth herein.
In the Stearns case it was argued that:

"* * * because .appellant did not obtain his
deed from the county until May, 1900, therefore he
did not have color of title until that time. * * *"
Admittedly after that time he would have had color of title.
This court further said:

"* * * For the purpose of meeting the presumption that appellant took and remained in pos. session in subordination of the paper title, it is immaterial that the tax deed was defective, and did not
in law convey an indefeasible title. Appellant's possession was just as much adverse to Borg's title, although the deed was defective, as it would have been
if the deed had conveyed a perfect title; the only
difference being that under a deed which is defective
the claimant in possession must obtain the title, if
he obtains it at all, by virtue of the statute, while
if the deed is good, and conveys an indefeasible title,
.the title is in him from the time the deed is delivered.
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"* * * If possession can ever be hostile and
adverse to the claimant of paper title, then it seems
to us that, under the evidence in this case, appellant's
possession was so, and that, unless the judgment or
decree can be supported upon some other ground,
it must fail."
In that case judgment had been given by the trial court in
favor of the holder of the record title, and this court reversed the trial court in favor of the tax title under adverse
possession of the appellant.
With respect to the lack of tax payments this court said:

"* * * Almanda Stearns had then failed to
pay any taxes on the property, and had apparently
abandoned it for a period of 17 or 18 years, when she
purported to convey it to Addison ·Cain. The respondent Borg, who is the grantee of Cain, stands in no
better plight than either Cain or Almanda Stearns
would stand. * * *"
1

In the case at bar the heirs of Oscar Hunter were
scattered over the country. Plaintiff's predecessors had
paid no attention to the property from the time when they
conveyed their interest to Mindwell Chipman Hunter in
1931, save for the deed which she later gave to Irene Hunter
Chamberlain in 19a6, and all of them failed to pay any
taxes on the property for a period now approaching nineteen years. The parties evidently knew the property had
been sold for taxes because Mindwell C. Hunter gave only
a bargain and sale deed, not a warranty deed, to Irene
Hunter Chamberlain in 1936, and Irene H. Chamberlain
McApline gave only a quitclaim deed to plaintiff in 1947.
Therefore, the same thing could be said of plaintiff and its
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predecessors as was said in the Stearns case-they failed
to pay any taxes on the property and apparently abandoned
it for a period of seventeen or eighteen years and then
purported to convey it to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff,
who is a grantee· of Irene Hunter Chamberlain is in no
better plight than either Mrs. Chamberlain or Mindwell
Chipman Hunter.
Clearly, under the authority of this Stearns case, t.he
possession of the defendant from a time it secured its deed
from Salt Lake c·ounty would not be "under and in subordination to the legal title" at any time after the county's deed
to the defendant, and it affirmatively appears that the_ prop. · · · · erty had not been seized or possessed by the plaintiff or any
of its predecessors at any time since 19'36.
Respondent respectfully submits that Section 104-2-5,
as amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 1943, is an effective bar to plaintiff in this action. The same provisions
were included in the amendment by which our legislature
amended Section 104-2-6, and Chapter 20, L·aws ·of Utah
1943, would likewise be applicable to bar plaintiff's action
and also confirms the argument given herein under what
is designated as appellant's point No. 4, showing the intent
of the legislature in enacting the statutes as they did in
1943.

ARGUMENT N·O. 7
·CHAPT'ER 19, LAWS OF UTAH 1943,. AS A·ME·NDED BY CH'AP'T;ER 8, LAWS O'F UT'A'H 1947, IS NOT
UN·CONSTITUTION AL.
1

1
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Respondent admits as good law that Chapter 8, Laws
of Utah 1947, should be considered unconstitutional if taken
alone and by itself. Had there been no prior enactment as
contained in 'Chapter 19, Laws of 1943, then it would have
been imperative to have a saving clause in Chapter 8, Laws
of 1947, by which some reasonable time would have been
given to enable prior property owners to make some claim
with respect to their property.
Defendant and respondent is not relying upon Chapter
8, Laws of 1947, to sustain its title by limitation herein.
Defendant is relying upon Chapter 19, Laws of 1943. However, ;Chapter 8, Laws of 1947, does assist the court in interpreting and construing what was meant by the legislature when it enacted Chapter 19, Laws of 1943. The enactment of such Chapter 19, together with the two adjoining
chapters, 18 and 20, shows very clearly the intent of the
legislature. Chapter 19 can be applied to all tax titles which
by reason of some defect did not pass to the county or to
subsequent purchasers what was intended. Where such
tax titles are .defective, as is true in the case at bar, ·Chapter
19, Laws of 1943, sets a limitation and prior owners must
assert their rights within four years. Chapter 8, Laws of
1947, merely clarified what was intended and very definitely shows that the legislature intended to cover all defective tax titles in order to get tax properties back .on the
rolls, and there was no intent to limit such four-year provision only to .tax titles that may accrue under the limited
construction as contended for by plaintiff. By giving this
interpretation to the statutes and by concluding that the
1947 amendment contained in Chapter 8 was merely a clar-
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ification by the legislature, there is no necessity of declaring said 'Chapter 8 unconstitutional, and if any construction
can be taken by this court which will so uphold such a statute as constitutional, then such interpretation and construction should be given..
ARGUMENT NO. 8

We would like to call the court's attention to the fact
that in the findings and judgment as signed by the court
defendant's title was not quieted. Defendant was not given
affirmative relief, and by barring the plaintiff from further prosecuting such an action, the court did not give the
defendant affirmative relief further than to say that the
action would be res judicata and that anyone claiming by
the plaintiff or through the plaintiff could not bring such
an action against the defendant upon the same facts.
·C·QN:CLUSION

By way of conclusion we wish to reiterate that the
question involved herein is not one as to whether the tax
sale or auditor's deed to the county and the resultant deed
to the defendant were valid or invalid. ·True, that matter
comes in incidentally because if the tax sale and the auditor's
tax deed and all tax proceedings had been valid, we would
not be concerned in any 'Yay with the 1943 statute contained in ·Chapter 19. But the fact that the tax sale and
the auditor's deed were not valid and that there was thus
a defect in the title which the county conveyed to the de-:fendant gives the reason and the only reason for the application of such a limitation statute. Such defect and
invalid tax title gives the reason and the only reason for ·
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the enactment of such a statute as was contai:r;ted in Chapter
19, and gives the reason and the only reason for the amendment of the two statutes as contained in Chapter 18 and
Chapter 20, Laws of 1943. If the tax title were valid and
if the auditor's deed defendant is relying on were also valid,
we would not attempt to rely either on the four-year statute
of limitation or any other statute of limitation. The tax
sale and the auditor's tax deed followed by the deed from
the county to the defendant merely gave rise to conditions
under which the defendant secured possession. The defendant secured that possession with the deed from the county
on or shortly prior to November 7, 1941, and that deed gave
the defendant color of title sufficient to form the basis of
an adverse possession against plaintiff or any of its predecessors. The fact that the tax proceedings were void does
not say that the county nor the defendant under the county
holds possession in subordination to the legal title. The
cases of this court have decided to the contrary, and such
tax proceedings do give inception to a new title which forms
a sufficient basis to show that defendant's possession was
adverse and not in subordination to the plaintiff's right.
•

The statute contained in Chapter 19, Laws of Utah
1943, is not a curative statute. It does not and did not intend to say that what the county had done on its tax titles
would be approved and that such tax titles would be considered as valid and proper, but the statute says that even
if such tax titles are invalid and improper, nevertheless
where adverse possession has its inception in the county
tax sale procedure the prior owner will be barred if he does
not assert his right in four years. The statute is one of
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limitation to enable the county to recover its tax monies and
to get such properties back on the tax rolls.

A consideration of the background and reason for the
enactment of the statute leaves no other construction for
this court except to conclude that by the 1943 statute the
legislature intended to give a basis whereby all of the defective tax titles that had accrued over the period of the
depression during the 1930's and prior could be perfected
by a shorter period of limitation, and there was no intent
whatsoever to limit it to tax procedures or tax sales which
had occurred after the amendment of 1939-. The intent of.
the legislature was to cover all tax titles and that intent
was very clearly and definitely shown by the amendment
which the legislature made in the 1947 law after controversies had arisen concerning what the 1943 law actually covered. The amendment merely clarified the 194:3 act.
Respondent submits that the trial court did not err in
any respect and the judgment of the trial court upholding
both the 1943 statute and the 1947 amendment with respect
thereto should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
A. U. MINER,

Of Counsel.
Salt Lake City, Utah,
August 1, 1949.
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